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Explaining the Impact of Formal Institutions on Social Trust: 
 A Psychological Approach 
 
 
Abstract 
By drawing on psychological models of action choice, this study distinguishes between four 
key factors that determine trust building: (1) knowledge to trust, (2) others-regarding, (3) 
cognition, and (4) contexts. These four factors are combined into a single analytical 
framework that is used for establishing channels through which the institutional context 
impacts social trust formation. Our theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that context is 
the strongest determinant of trust, with its overall effect being, however, modified by the 
degree to which the individual’s knowledge of trusting, cognition, and others-regarding are 
developed. The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies 
(PIAAC) data from the year 2012 are utilised for testing our propositions.  
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Explaining the Impact of Formal Institutions on Social Trust: 
 A Psychological Approach 
 
Introduction 
Trust is traditionally considered as a cultural attribute that is influenced by an individual’s 
internal values and formed during early socialisation processes (Fukuyama, 2000). Recent 
studies have dissociated trust building from an individual’s personal characteristics and 
externalised it to contextual properties (Nooteboom, 2007; Rothstein & Stolle, 2001), with 
formal institutions often viewed as one such contextual factor (Farrell, 2005; Farrell & 
Knight, 2003).  
Analyses of institutional contexts’ impact on trust are drawn upon a twofold 
definition of institutions. First, institutions are viewed as a set of public organisations that 
individuals interact with over the course of their lives. The process of trust formation is 
affected by such organisations, as citizens evaluate the quality of their performance (Edlund, 
2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001) or that of elected officials (Thomas, 1998). A positive 
experience motivates individuals to exhibit more trust towards these institutions and people 
(Letki, 2006; Murphy, 2004; Tyler, 2006). In eliciting trust, public authorities need not be 
objectively trustworthy, but they must be perceived as such by citizens (Levi, 1998; Scholz & 
Lubell, 1998). 
Second, institutions are viewed as a set of rules that define legal boundaries within 
which individuals are allowed – and expected – to act. Efficient formal institutions are 
conducive to establishing trust, since they enforce third-party agreements (Herreros & 
Criado, 2008). They enable individuals to pursue redress and restitution when wronged, 
thereby reducing the risk involved in trusting someone (Rothstein & Stolle, 2001; Tillmar & 
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Lindkvist, 2007) and serving as a safety net (Farrell, 2005). If sanctions and penalties are 
imposed when a contract is breached, formal institutions may also increase the cost of 
betrayal (Bohnet & Baytelman, 2007) and overcome the information deficit problem by 
indicating how others are likely to act (Farrell & Knight, 2003). Formal institutions’ impact is 
especially strong when formal rules are duly enforced (Oskarsson, Öberg & Svensson, 2009) 
and perceived by individuals as being fairly applied to various population groups (Oskarsson 
et al., 2009). 
Although both strands found empirical evidence for a positive relationship between 
the quality of formal institutions and trust levels, they exhibit a common deficiency: They 
lack a clear formalisation of the mechanisms through which institutional contexts influence 
trust. Most empirical studies either solely examine the associations that exist between trust 
levels and institutional scores while controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents (Herreros & Criado, 2008). Or, they offer mathematical models, derived from the 
rational choice perspective (Zak & Knack, 2001), which do not account for non-cognitive 
(cultural) forces beyond rational thinking that underlie an individual’s decision-making 
regarding whether or not to trust. In both cases, it becomes impossible to establish the 
complete set of channels through which formal institutions affect trust among individuals.   
This research’s main objective is to introduce a new comprehensive model of trust 
formation in institutional contexts by drawing on various theories of psychology. Since 
trusting others is a mental operation governed by brain structures, we argue that action choice 
models can explain how trust emerges and describe what role formal institutions play in this 
process. Applying a psychological approach to explain trust formation enables addressing 
cognitive and non-cognitive, as well as conscious and subconscious, mechanisms of an 
individual’s decision-making simultaneously. This allows us to integrate cultural and 
contextual factors of trust into a single analytical framework. 
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Literature Overview and Extension  
Psychology’s point of departure is that every individual defines their own behaviour based on 
an organized mental representation (scheme) of how an individual with certain values is 
likely to think, feel, and act (Shao, Aquino & Freeman, 2008), a so called moral identity 
(Bandura, 1991, 2001; Higgins, 1996; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele & Lasky, 2006; Shao et al., 
2008). An individual is believed to possess multiple and sometimes competing mental 
representations that might not exist chaotically, as they are organized according to one’s 
internal understanding of the world (Taatgen, Huss, Dickison & Anderson, 2008). Each of the 
mental representations is not stored in the individual’s memory as mere facts but is 
augmented with (a) preconditions under which they can be carried out and (b) a 
representation of their expected outcomes (Taatgen et al., 2008).  
Regardless of the actual volume of one’s stock of mental representations, only one of 
them can be activated for processing social information and hence be mapped onto an action 
at any given moment (Higgins, 1996; Markus & Kunda, 1986). Which one is ultimately 
activated depends on many factors, including the environment within which the individual is 
placed (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi & Tota, 1986; Shao et al., 2008). Environmental or 
contextual properties are often viewed as the key determinant in choosing the mental 
representation that will be mapped onto an action.  
The individual’s interaction with the context unfolds through the perceptual system 
and results in collecting perceptual input (Prinz, 1997). The brain uses the perceptual input to 
align the observed contextual properties with the preconditions and outcomes of mental 
representations. When preconditions and expected outcomes match the perceptual input, the 
corresponding mental representation is mapped onto an action (Taatgen et al., 2008). 
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Psychology has identified two major problems that may arise during the match 
process. First, all of the information about the contextual properties is not available or 
observable. In this case, the individual’s internal understanding of the world governs the 
selection of a mental representation leading to the action (Taatgen 2005, 2007). Second, the 
mental representation containing the necessary contextual characteristics as a precondition 
might not be present in one’s declarative memory. Experiments show that, in this case, 
participants simply discover the relevant knowledge of action by taking a random action and 
observing whether it can bring them closer to the goal. Once the correct action is selected, a 
new record (mental representation) is created with the original perceptual state as a 
precondition and the resulting perceptual state as a post-condition (Taatgen et al., 2008).  
Personal experience with the context hence shapes the individual’s behaviour by 
activating or triggering the formation of a mental representation that contains the knowledge 
required for optimal action in the given context. Psychology further suggests that the 
context’s influence may go beyond the individual’s own behaviour and can be extended to 
their expectations regarding other people’s behaviour. One’s personal experience with the 
new context may prompt the individual to expect others to act similarly as a result of a 
similar experience in the given context (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Jones, 1996). An individual 
who is positively affected by the context may hence make references from their own 
behaviour to others’ behaviour, re-assessing their perception of others regarding their 
intentions and motives (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Jones, 1996).  
 
Analytical Framework 
We define trust as an individual’s expression of confidence in the intentions and motives of 
others (Deutsch, 1958; Mellinger, 1956). As such, trust arises through interactions with other 
people whereas the decision of whether or not to trust someone is based on assessing others’ 
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trustworthiness (Hardin, 2001; Coleman, 1982). We further expand this conventional 
understanding of trust formation with psychological determinants of action choice while 
viewing the selection of the level of trust to display as an action. We therefore suggest that 
trust is determined by four key factors: 
 
Trust = f(Knowledge, Others-regarding, Cognition, Context),                       (1)               
 
where Knowledge refers to an individual’s set of mental representations, with each 
containing the knowledge of how much trust to exhibit towards others in every particular 
situation. In line with the psychological models of action choice, we assume that these mental 
representations are structured according to the individual’s internal understanding of the 
world and that only one of them is activated in any given moment. This results in displaying 
the level of trust that is embedded within the activated mental representation. We further 
assume that any knowledge of trust is formed through both early socialisation processes 
(Rotenberg, 2007) and an individual’s past course of actions or past experience with other 
people (Hardin, 2001).  
Others-regarding refers to an individual’s perception of other people’s motives and 
intentions. We believe that it is influenced by direct interactions with other individuals and 
may traditionally include evaluating others’ trustworthiness in deciding which level of trust to 
display. But we deviate from this conventional understanding of how the regarding others 
enters the trust equation. We focus on the individual’s ability to learn from acting in the 
institutional context and to generalize the impact of formal institutions from one’s own 
behaviour to the behaviour of others, which shapes the individual’s expectations about other 
people’s actions.  
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Cognition refers to the individual’s general cognitive abilities to perceive, process, 
and record information, such as declarative memory, procedural memory, and processing 
speed. This component is expected to predefine the quality and the speed of mental 
operations involved in collecting the perceptual input about the contexts’ properties, the 
choice of mental representation, and its mapping onto an action.  
Context refers to the properties of the institutional context that the individual 
perceives and utilises to match the preconditions and outcomes of mental representations in 
choosing the mental representation that will be mapped onto an action. 
We model trust formation, as defined by the four factors, as follows (please see Figure 
1). An individual possesses (1) a cognitive system of certain qualities and (2) a set of mental 
representations that store information regarding how much they can trust others in various 
institutional contexts. The knowledge stored in these mental representations is assumed to 
stem from the individual’s cultures, experiences, and overall goals. In accordance with the 
psychological models, we expect that these mental representations are augmented by (a) the 
precondition that specifies which level of trust should be displayed in a certain institutional 
context, and (b) the expected outcome that this particular level of trust may lead to in this 
institutional context. In choosing the level of trust, the individual evaluates the context in 
which they are placed and forms expectations about other people’s motives or intentions in 
this context. Both pieces of information are linked and matched to the preconditions and 
outcomes of mental representations. The one that corresponds to the match criteria is selected 
and the level of trust stored in this mental representation will be displayed. If no match is 
found, the individual randomly selects the level of trust to display towards others. It will be 
stored as a new mental representation if the new level of trust is sufficient to bring the 
individual closer to their goals. If the chosen level of trust is insufficient for the given 
context, random selection is repeated until the match between one’s goals and the outcomes 
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of exhibiting this certain level of trust is found. Personal experience with the context is 
further extrapolated by the individual to other people acting in the same context, reshaping 
this individual’s expectations regarding other people’s behaviour in the given contextual 
properties. The individual uses this information to determine which level of trust to exhibit 
towards others in later interactions, provided that the contextual properties and one’s personal 
experience with them remain unchanged.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
We further argue that the context’s ultimate impact on the individual’s level of trust is 
related to the individual’s knowledge, others-regarding, and cognition. Proposition 1: We 
expect that the institutional context’s positive impact on trust is greater for individuals who 
already possess mental representations with the knowledge of exhibiting sufficiently high 
levels of trust. Good institutional contexts may encourage the up-levelling of trust by 
activating a mental representation corresponding to high trust levels. In order to become 
active, the brain should previously have recorded such mental representation. If this is not the 
case, the individual is less likely to display the optimal level of trust in good institutional 
contexts. When lacking a match, the individual must randomly select a trust level and analyze 
this action’s consequences. Since this process usually involves errors, it may take time before 
the right level of trust is determined and stored as a new record in the brain. Additionally, the 
brain chooses a new level of trust, even when randomly or not, through drawing analogies 
with the existing knowledge of trust. This suggests that any positive, even substantial, 
developments in the institutional context are unlikely to lead to a sudden leap from distrust to 
complete trust for the individual with no, or little, knowledge to trust. Rather, trust levels will 
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gradually increase, as the individual chooses to display more and more trust until the optimal 
level of trust is attained.  
Proposition 2: We expect that the institutional context’s positive impact on trust will 
be greater for individuals who can better extrapolate their own positive experiences from the 
context to others. To trust others, one must account for others’ motives and intentions. One’s 
expectations regarding others’ motives and intentions can change when the new institutional 
context provides positive experiences. When an improved institutional environment triggers a 
positive change in one’s own behaviour, the individual may assume that this context can also 
encourage other individuals to act more honestly, ameliorating this individual’s expectation 
regarding others’ motives and intentions, which leads to higher trust levels towards them. The 
overall change in trust levels through this extrapolation mechanism may hence depend on the 
extent to which the individual is able or willing to make references from their own experience 
with the new context to other people’s behaviour. The individual who has a more developed 
extrapolation mechanism is expected to display more trust towards others when the 
institutional context improves. 
Proposition 3: We expect that the context’s positive impact on social trust is stronger 
for individuals who possess a better cognitive system. The action choice process includes 
numerous mental operations, such as collecting perceptual input, coupling between perceived 
contextual properties and preconditions or outcomes of mental representations, and mapping 
the selected mental representation onto an action. As such, an individual’s general cognitive 
abilities may determine the speed and quality with which the brain performs these operations. 
Because the matching and learning processes are usually faster and more efficient for 
individuals with better cognition, we expect that such individuals are more responsive to 
positive changes in contextual properties, and hence the contextual improvements’ positive 
impact on trust is greater for them. We also acknowledge that this impact is strong in the 
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periods immediately following a change in institutional contexts and tends to subside when 
an individual attains the right level of trust in the new or changed institutional environment.   
We use the above observations to postulate our hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The institutional context’s positive impact on trust is greater for individuals 
who possess better knowledge to trust.   
Hypothesis 2: The institutional context’s positive impact on trust is greater for individuals 
who have a more developed extrapolation mechanism.  
Hypothesis 3: The institutional context’s positive impact on trust is greater for individuals 
who have a better cognitive system.  
 
Data and Methods Description 
To test our hypotheses, we utilise the public use data from the Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) conducted in 2012 (see 
https://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/surveyofadultskills.htm for a more detailed description of the 
PIAAC survey). This database is unique, because it provides the measure of social trust 
limited to faith in other people and not linked to the individual’s caution levels as is often the 
case in socio-economic surveys (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson,  2010;  Miller & Mitamura,  2003). 
Our sample includes Austria, Belgium (Flanders), the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the 
Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (England and 
Northern Ireland), and the USA. Australia and Canada are excluded from the analysis, since 
data for many variables were suppressed for these countries. The sample is restricted to 
respondents aged between 16 and 65 years. 
We use the following set of variables to empirically test our hypotheses (please see 
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). 
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Table 1 about here 
 
Dependent variable  
Social trust is approximated by asking the respondents to specify whether they agree 
with the statement that they can only trust a few people completely. The response scale varies 
from 1 “strongly agree” to 5 “strongly disagree”.  
Independent variables  
In operationalizing Knowledge, we adopted the conventional assumption that 
involvement in voluntary associations leads individuals to form trust. Volunteering is 
expected to offer regular and close contact with others, and such contacts help to develop 
reciprocity, cooperation, empathy for others, an understanding of the common interest and 
common good and, as a result, the knowledge of trust (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000; 
Paxton, 2002). The volunteering variable is operationalized through the question asking how 
often the respondent did voluntary work in the last 12 months, with the response values 
ranging between 1 “never” and 5 “every day”.  
Others-regarding is expected to capture whether the respondent tends to link or 
extrapolate their own knowledge/experiences to others and is measured through a synthetic 
construct obtained by adding the responses to six questions about the extent to which the 
respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) When I learn or read about new ideas, I 
try to relate them to real life situations to which they might apply, (2) I like learning new 
things, (3) When I come across something new, I try to relate it to what I already know, (4) I 
like to get to the bottom of difficult things, (5) I like to figure out how different ideas fit 
together, and (6) If I do not understand something, I look for additional information to make 
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it clearer. The final construct has a scale ranging between 6 and 30, with higher values 
corresponding to a greater subjective propensity to extrapolate information.  
Cognition is measured through the individual’s cognitive abilities and is constructed 
by averaging out the cognitive test results in literacy and numeracy, as in Blau and Kahn 
(2005). Each of the two constructs represents a mean of ten possible values that the PIAAC 
survey provides.  
Context is operationalized through the perceived legitimacy of governmental policies. 
The legitimacy variable is expected to reflect the quality of the country’s institutional 
environment and is measured through the extent to which the respondents agree with the 
following statement: “People like me do not have any say about what the government does”. 
The response scale ranges between 1 “strongly agree” to 5 “strongly disagree”.  
Control variables 
We control for the conventional determinants of trust: respondents’ education level, 
income, health condition, living with a spouse or partner, the presence of children in the 
household, immigration status, and age. The education level is measured by two dummies. 
The first takes the value of 1 if the respondent has obtained a higher-level education, and the 
second takes the value of 1 if the respondent has obtained a middle-level education. A low 
education is used as a reference category. The income variable is operationalized through the 
PIAAC derived variable which specifies the decimal to which the respondent’s yearly income 
belongs. The health condition is measured through a question asking respondents to self-rate 
their health status from 1 “excellent” to 5 “poor”. The living with a spouse or partner variable 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the respondents declare living with a spouse or 
partner. The presence of children in the household is measured by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the respondents declare that the household has at least one child. 
Immigration status is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual 
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was born in the country where the survey was conducted. The respondents’ age is measured 
in ten-year bands. 
Additionally, we include learning-related and work-related controls in the trust 
regression.  Participation in lifelong learning is measured by questions where respondents 
specify whether they did any of the following learning activities within the last twelve 
months: (1) courses or private lessons, (2) seminars or workshops, (3) courses conducted 
through open or distance education, or (4) any organized on-the-job training sessions or 
training by supervisors or co-workers. The final construct’s response scale ranges from 0 “no 
participation in lifelong learning” to 4 “active participation in lifelong learning”. Unrealized 
learning is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1if the individual specifies 
that, in the last 12 months, there were learning activities the individual wanted to participate 
in but did not. Learning on the job is a synthetic variable constructed by summing up 
responses to three questions asking how often the current job involves: (1) learning new 
work-related things from co-workers or supervisors, (2) learning-by-doing from tasks one 
performs, and (3) keeping up-to-date with new products or services. Each item has a response 
scale ranging from 1 “never” to 5 “every day” so that the final construct has values between 3 
“no learning on the job” and 15 “active learning on the job”.  
We also control for job tasks and emotions-related variables. Based on a factor 
analysis, we combined job-task questions into four constructs, as presented in the social trust 
base model. The respondents’ involvement in managerial responsibilities is captured by a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent currently manages or supervises 
other employees. The level of workplace stress due to the workload is operationalized 
through the number of weekly work hours. Skill mismatch is measured through a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the respondents specify that they can cope with more demanding duties 
than those they are currently required to perform.  
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Finally, we control for the respondent’s job sector, job stability, and workplace 
freedom. The job sector is measured through two dummies specifying whether the 
individual’s job belongs to the public or non-profit sector, with the private sector representing 
a reference category. Job stability is measured by the number of different firms or 
organisations the respondent has changed in the last five years. The freedom at workplace is 
derived by asking whether the individual can choose or change their working hours. The 
response scale varies from 1 “not at all” to 5 “to a very high extent”.  
Methods used in the analysis 
The main method of analysis is multilevel modelling, which accounts for our data’s 
hierarchical structure and prevents the un-modelled country information from being pooled 
into the single individual error term (Kreft & Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004). The base model 
takes the following form: 
 
Tij = γ00 + γ10Knowledgeij + γ20Others-regardingij + γ30Cognitionij + γ40Contextij + 
γ50Xij + moj + εij                                                                                                                                                                               (2) 
 
Here, Tij stands for the individual level of social trust. Knowledgeij, Others-
regardingij, Cognitionij, and Contextij are the measures for the knowledge, others-regarding, 
cognition, and contextual factors, respectively. X ij is a set of control variables, moj is the 
variance at the country level, and εij is the variance at the individual level. We further 
augment the base model by including interaction terms between the context and the three 
other factors as follows: 
 
16 
 
Tij = γ00 + γ10Knowledgeij + γ20Others-regardingij + γ30Cognitionij + γ40Contextij + 
γ50Knowledge*Contextij + γ60Others-regarding*Contextij + γ70Cognition*Contextij + +γ80Xij 
+ moj + εij                                                                                                                                                                                              (3) 
 
 where Tij is trust scores, Knowledgeij, Others-regardingij, Cognitionij, and Contextij 
are the measures for the four trust factors as described above.  Knowledge*Contextij, Others-
regarding*Contextij, and Cognition*Contextij are the interaction terms between the contextual 
factor and the three other trust factors that are (sequentially) included in the base model. 
Again, X is the set of individual-level control variables, m is the country-level variance, 
whereas ε is the individual-level variance. 
The STATA gllamm command is utilised to calculate the model’s parameters. Since 
social trust is an ordinal variable, the ologit link is specified together with the binomial family 
sub-options. Additionally, we include the GLLAMM adapt option, which causes adaptive 
quadrature to be used instead of ordinary quadrature. 
 
Analysis and Results 
The results of the social trust base model are consistent with previous findings concerning the 
impact of conventional trust determinants and work-related factors on trust levels (please see 
Table 2). Augmenting the base model with the four factors substantially improves the 
model’s fit. Overall, our results indicate that individuals with more knowledge of trust tend to 
have higher trust scores (please see Table 3). Similarly, individuals with a better cognitive 
system display more trust. Surprisingly, a more developed extrapolation mechanism is 
associated with lower trust levels. Finally, individuals who assign higher scores to formal 
institutions have higher trust scores. These impacts do not change after applying the selected 
strategies of robustness check, such as (1) controlling for sample size variations (please see 
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Appendix 1 for results), or (2) controlling for endogeneity in the relationship between the 
four components and social trust (please see Appendix 2 for results). 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 about here 
 
Among the four factors that our model introduced, context proves the strongest 
determinant of social trust. The model’s fit measured through the log likelihood change 
improves substantially after including the institutional variable in the trust equation. The 
formal institutions’ role in trust building also increases after accounting for the interactions 
between the institutional context and one’s knowledge, others-regarding, and cognition 
(please see Table 4). In line with Hypothesis 1, the institutional context’s positive impact on 
social trust is significantly greater for individuals who possess better knowledge of trusting 
others. Our analysis also suggests that the further the relative distance between the optimal 
level of knowledge of trusting, which was calculated as the highest country-level value 
(Norway), and the individual’s actual knowledge of trusting, the less important the 
institutional context becomes for the trust formation process. The contextual effects on trust 
are also stronger for individuals who have a more developed extrapolation mechanism and 
can better generalize new knowledge to new domains or to others’ behaviours. This positive 
interaction effect has been found regardless the fact that the others-regarding variable is 
negatively associated with trust levels. We do not detect any interaction between the context 
and the cognition variables and hence more intelligent or more able individuals do not show a 
stronger impact of good formal institutions on trust levels. Nonetheless, we reveal a strong 
interaction between the knowledge and cognition variables, suggesting that the formation of 
knowledge to trust occurs faster for more able individuals.  
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Table 4 about here 
 
Overall, the empirical analysis supports our four factor model of trust creation. Our 
results confirm that the institutional context is not only the strongest determinant of trust 
building but also stands in a close relationship to the three other factors in the trust formation 
process. To analyze how imbalances in the four factors’ maturity levels may impact trust 
formation, we group countries according to their values on these four factors. By applying a 
hierarchical cluster analysis to the aggregated dataset (please see Figure 2), we distinguish 
between four country groups (please see Table 5). The first encompasses Finland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, where all the four components take high values, resulting 
in high trust levels. The second group includes France, Ireland, Korea, Poland, the UK, and 
the USA, where the knowledge component is slightly better developed than the cognition and 
context components, resulting in average levels of trust. The third group consists of Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, the Russian Federation, and the 
Slovak Republic, with lower scores on volunteering but relatively good values on the 
cognitive and contextual components, with trust scores being close to those of the second 
group. The fourth group includes Italy and Spain, where all the four components are 
underdeveloped compared to other countries, resulting in the sample’s lowest trust levels. 
One should note that the others-regarding component does not show a substantial variation 
across the country groups. In Figure 3, we provide a four-dimensional visualization of this 
country grouping. 
 
 
Table 5 about here  
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Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here 
 
To estimate the four groups’ potential to increase social trust levels by improving 
their context, we conduct a prediction exercise in which we assign the context variable’s 
highest value of 5 to the individuals’ contextual component while keeping the three other 
components unchanged. The STATA gllapred option (for more details see Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal,  2008) is used to make the predictions. The procedure requires first conducting a 
multilevel analysis of actual trust scores and then calculating predictions. In doing so, we 
calculate the marginal cumulative probability and conditional cumulative probabilities with 
random intercept equal to zero. We further calculate a mean value of such predictions for 
each country and report them in comparison to the actual value of trust (please see Table 6). 
Our analysis reveals that even if all people in the selected countries have a similarly positive 
perception of a government’s effectiveness, the trust scores still remain heterogeneous across 
the four groups. Group 1, with the best scores on the four factors, has the highest predicted 
trust levels. Group 4, with the lowest scores on the four factors, has the lowest predicted trust 
scores. Interestingly, our results suggest that Group 3, with a poor volunteering tradition but 
high values on the cognitive component, will improve trust scores to a slightly greater extent 
than Group 2, with a more developed tradition of volunteering but relatively worse 
investments in formal and non-formal education. Both groups however still remain behind 
Group 1 in their predicted trust levels. This finding’s key implication is that an individual’s 
response to improving institutional contexts depends not only on an actual change in formal 
institutions, but also on the quality of the individual’s stock of knowledge to trust, cognition, 
and the degree to which this individual applies the extrapolation mechanism in analyzing 
their own and others’ behaviour.  
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Table 6 about here 
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
Overall, our study supports the four factor conceptual framework of trust formation. Both 
theoretical and empirical elaborations indicate that formal institutions can considerably 
modify the dynamics and patterns of trust building processes. Our results are in line with the 
previous findings, demonstrating that “the public” is an important determinant of “the 
private” (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2007), but the extent to which “the public” ultimately 
intervenes into “the private” depends on the actual properties of this “private”. The context’s 
overall impact on trust is a function of a particular individual’s actual properties, such as 
current stocks of knowledge of trusting, the distance between the current knowledge and the 
optimal level of knowledge for the given context, ones’ cognition, and the ability to learn and 
extrapolate one’s own knowledge and experiences to other individuals. These properties set 
certain constraints in the relationship between the formal institutional context and social trust.  
Further research is needed to eliminate two major drawbacks of our study. First, an 
alternative set of operationalisations should be found for each of the four factors to further 
validate the complex structure of the trust formation processes introduced by our model. 
Second, it is necessary to check the dynamic nature of the relationship between the four 
factors and social trust by testing the proposed analytical framework with longitudinal data. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables Used in the Analysis  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Social trust 76558 1.000 5.000 2.362 1.161 
Knowledge  76658 1.000 5.000 1.642 1.019 
Distance to knowledge  76658 -0.579 1.101 0.646 0.627 
Orhers-regarding 76055 6.000 30.000 21.950 4.359 
Cognition 76711 37.870 426.120 278.129 42.914 
Context  76289 1.000 5.000 2.767 1.259 
Respondent’s education level       
Highly-educated  73509 0.000 1.000 0.396 0.489 
Middle-educated  73509 0.000 1.000 0.461 0.498 
Yearly income percentile 70921 1.000 6.000 3.335 1.532 
Age 76722 1.000 5.000 3.108 1.266 
Health status 76651 1.000 5.000 2.480 0.985 
Living with a spouse or partner 66705 0.000 1.000 0.741 0.438 
Children in the household 76659 0.000 1.000 0.649 0.477 
Born in the country 76689 0.000 1.000 0.909 0.287 
Lifelong learning 75372 0.000 4.000 0.903 0.967 
Unrealized learning  75388 0.000 1.000 0.269 0.443 
Learning in the job 70006 3.000 15.000 9.847 3.111 
Job tasks       
Teaching, presentations, 
planning for others 
76570 3.000 15.000 6.802 3.514 
Cooperating or sharing 
information with others 
70243 2.000 10.000 7.633 2.213 
Selling, advising or 
influencing others 
76373 4.000 20.000 11.464 4.952 
Planning or organizing 
activities for oneself 
76502 2.000 10.000 8.079 2.704 
Managerial responsibilities  66329 0.000 1.000 0.289 0.454 
Economic sector  PRIVATE 76550 0.000 1.000 0.724 0.447 
Economic sector PUBLIC 76550 0.000 1.000 0.249 0.433 
Economic sector NONPROFIT 76550 0.000 1.000 0.027 0.161 
Number of firms worked in 76604 0.000 7.000 1.810 1.267 
Flexibility with working hours 76649 1.000 5.000 2.658 1.407 
Job satisfaction 76657 1.000 5.000 1.993 0.843 
Working hours per week 73163 1.000 125.000 38.319 13.441 
Skill mismatch  76032 0.000 1.000 0.832 0.374 
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Table 2. Social Trust Base Model  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Respondent’s education level      
Highly- educated  0.732*** 0.646*** 0.598*** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) 
Middle-educated  0.212*** 0.195*** 0.179*** 
  (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) 
Yearly  income percentile  0.050*** 0.030*** 0.048*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Age   0.075*** 0.084*** 0.067*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Health status  -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.107*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Living with a spouse or partner  0.073*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Children in the household  -0.107*** -0.099*** -0.114*** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Born in the country  0.229*** 0.217*** 0.182*** 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) 
Lifelong learning    0.101*** 0.087*** 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
Unrealized learning    -0.031 -0.021 
   (0.019) (0.019) 
Learning in the job   0.009*** 0.005 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Job tasks      
Teaching, presentations,    0.025*** 0.021*** 
planning for others   (0.003) (0.003) 
Cooperating or sharing    0.001 0.005 
information with others   (0.004) (0.004) 
Selling, advising or    -0.004** -0.003 
influencing others   (0.002) (0.002) 
Planning or organizing    0.008** 0.002 
activities for oneself   (0.004) (0.004) 
Managerial responsibilities    -0.078*** -0.079*** 
   (0.022) (0.022) 
Economic sector PUBLIC    0.134*** 
    (0.020) 
Economic sector NON-PROFIT    0.260*** 
    (0.051) 
Number of firms worked in    -0.014** 
    (0.007) 
Flexibility with working hours    0.052*** 
    (0.007) 
Job satisfaction     -0.097*** 
    (0.011) 
Working hours per week    -0.004*** 
    (0.001) 
Skill mismatch    -0.086*** 
    (0.023) 
Between-class variance  0.272  0.336 0.279  0.333  
 (0.084) (0.048) (0.084) (0.065) 
Log likelihood  -102739.970 -77694.231 -66789.354 -66530.996 
Number of level 2 units  21 20 20 20 
Number of level 1 units 75,718 58,277 50,245 50,149 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Social Trust Augmented Model, with the Four Psychological Factors  
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Knowledge  0.083***    0.064*** 
 (0.009)    (0.009) 
Others-regarding  -0.008***   -0.021*** 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Cognition    0.004***  0.003*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Context     0.377*** 0.372*** 
    (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant      
      
Cut 1 -0.712*** -0.918*** 0.153 -0.078 0.474*** 
 (0.120) (0.142) (0.104) (0.093) (0.105) 
Cut 2 1.375*** 1.167*** 2.245*** 2.085*** 2.646*** 
 (0.120) (0.142) (0.104) (0.094) (0.106) 
Cut 3 1.986*** 1.777*** 2.857*** 2.712*** 3.276*** 
 (0.121) (0.142) (0.105) (0.094) (0.106) 
Cut 4 3.907*** 3.696*** 4.780*** 4.672*** 5.238*** 
 (0.122) (0.143) (0.107) (0.096) (0.108) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Between-class variance   0.244  0.254  0.262  0.347  0.262  
 (0.065) (0.081) (0.046) (0.037) (0.025) 
Log likelihood  -65961.077 -65999.889 -65876.738 -64743.043 -64606.693 
Number of level 2 units  20 20 20 20 20 
Number of level 1 units 49,766 49,766 49,766 49,766 49,766 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The list of controls includes the full set of variables from the social trust 
base model.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Interactions between the Key Trust Factors  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
Knowledge  0.011  0.064*** 0.064*** -0.239*** 
 (0.022)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.062) 
Distance to Knowledge   -0.015    
  (0.036)    
Others-regarding -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cognition  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Context  0.343*** 0.395*** 0.255*** 0.322*** 0.372*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.036) (0.048) (0.008) 
Context * Knowledge  0.018***     
 (0.006)     
Context * Distance to   -0.035***    
Knowledge  (0.011)    
Context * Others-regarding   0.005***   
   (0.002)   
Context * Cognition     0.001  
    (0.000)  
Knowledge * Cognition      0.001*** 
     (0.000) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Between-class variance  0.262  0.262  0.244 0.222  0.258  
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Log likelihood  -64603.251 -64596.754 -64600.768 -64605.357 -64593.684 
Number of level 2 units  20 20 20 20 20 
Number of level 1 units 49,766 49,766 49,766 49,766 49,766 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The list of controls includes the full set of variables from the social trust 
base model.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. The Four Factors’ Mean Values, by Country Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Knowledge  
Others- 
regarding  
Cognition  Context  
G
ro
u
p
 1
 
 
Finland 
Japan 
The Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
 
1.8 
(Strong) 
21.8 
(Average) 
291.3 
(Strong) 
3.1 
(Strong) 
G
ro
u
p
 2
 
 
France 
Ireland 
Korea 
Poland 
The UK 
The USA 
 
1.6 
(Relatively 
Strong) 
21.9 
(Average) 
270.5 
(Relatively 
Weak) 
2.7 
(Relatively 
Weak) 
G
ro
u
p
 3
 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
The Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Germany 
The Russian Federation 
The Slovak Republic 
 
1.5 
(Relatively 
Weak) 
21.9 
(Average) 
280.7 
(Relatively 
Strong) 
2.8 
(Relatively 
Strong) 
G
ro
u
p
 4
 
 
Italia 
Spain 
1.4 
(Weak) 
22.9 
(Relatively 
Strong) 
258.4 
(Relatively 
Weak) 
2.3 
(Weak) 
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Table 6. Predicted Levels of Social Trust, by Country Group  
 Actual 
trust 
scores 
Predicted social trust scores 
Linear  
Conditional cumulative probabilities Marginal cumulative probabilities  
above 1 above 2  above 3 above 4 above 1 above 2 above 3 above 4 
G
ro
u
p
 
 1
 
Finland 2.785 2.742 0.902 0.523 0.373 0.080 0.893 0.522 0.379 0.088 
Japan 2.329 2.745 0.902 0.524 0.373 0.079 0.894 0.523 0.380 0.088 
Netherlands, the 2.733 2.762 0.903 0.527 0.378 0.081 0.894 0.526 0.385 0.089 
Norway 2.846 2.804 0.906 0.538 0.389 0.085 0.897 0.536 0.394 0.094 
Sweden 2.839 2.802 0.906 0.537 0.387 0.085 0.898 0.536 0.393 0.093 
Group average  2.706 2.771  0.904 0.530 0.380 0.082 0.895 0.529 0.386 0.090 
G
ro
u
p
 
2
 
France 1.939 2.589 0.887 0.486 0.339 0.069 0.878 0.487 0.347 0.077 
Ireland 2.206 2.672 0.894 0.506 0.358 0.075 0.886 0.506 0.365 0.083 
Korea 2.239 2.539 0.882 0.474 0.328 0.067 0.872 0.475 0.337 0.074 
Poland 2.306 2.486 0.878 0.460 0.316 0.062 0.861 0.449 0.314 0.066 
UK, the 2.259 2.670 0.894 0.506 0.358 0.075 0.885 0.505 0.365 0.083 
USA, the 2.341 2.642 0.890 0.499 0.353 0.075 0.881 0.499 0.360 0.082 
Group average 2.215 2.600 0.888 0.489 0.342 0.071 0.877 0.487 0.348 0.078 
G
ro
u
p
 
 3
 
Belgium 2.315 2.703 0.898 0.514 0.365 0.078 0.889 0.513 0.372 0.085 
Czech Rep., the 1.956 2.538 0.883 0.474 0.328 0.066 0.873 0.475 0.336 0.073 
Denmark 3.181 2.811 0.906 0.539 0.390 0.086 0.898 0.537 0.396 0.094 
Estonia 2.008 2.590 0.887 0.486 0.339 0.069 0.878 0.487 0.347 0.077 
Germany 2.263 2.669 0.894 0.506 0.358 0.075 0.885 0.505 0.365 0.083 
Russian Fed., the 2.332 2.486 0.878 0.461 0.316 0.062 0.868 0.463 0.325 0.069 
Slovak Rep., the 2.009 2.496 0.879 0.463 0.318 0.063 0.869 0.465 0.327 0.069 
Group average  2.295 2.613 0.889 0.492 0.345 0.071 0.880 0.492 0.353 0.079 
G
ro
u
p
 
4
 
Italy 1.948 2.434 0.872 0.449 0.306 0.060 0.861 0.451 0.315 0.067 
Spain  2.323 2.459 0.872 0.455 0.313 0.062 0.862 0.457 0.321 0.069 
Group average  2.136 2.447 0.872 0.452 0.310 0.061 0.862 0.454 0.318 0.068 
Notes: The model used for calculating the predictions is as follows: Trust = 0.064Knowledge–0.021Others_regarding+0.003Cognition+0.372Context+ 
0.393Respondent_highly_educated+0.095Respondent_middle_educated+0.022Income+0.079Age–0.092Health_status+0.061Living_with_spouse–
0.088Children+0.051Born_in_the_country+0.061Lifelong_learning-0.045Unrealized_learning+0.008Leanring_in_the_job+0.017Job_tasks_1+0.009Job_tasks_2 
– 0.006Job_tasks_3–0.001Job_tasks_4 – 0.077Managerial_responsibilities+0.115Economic_sector_PUBLIC+0.187Economic_sector_NONProfit–
0.022Number_of_firms_worked+0.035Flexibility–0.082Job_satisfaction–0.003Working_hours–0.080Skill_mismatch. Predictions are calculated by assuming that all 
respondents assign the institutional context the highest value of “5”.
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Appendix 1.  
Robustness Check: Variations in the Sample Size  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Knowledge 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.119*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Others-regarding -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cognition 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Context  0.368*** 0.370*** 0.373*** 0.366*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant     
Cut 1 0.134 0.470*** 0.482*** 0.871*** 
 (0.158) (0.107) (0.106) (0.068) 
Cut 2 2.309*** 2.639*** 2.656*** 2.994*** 
 (0.158) (0.108) (0.107) (0.069) 
Cut 3 2.964*** 3.268*** 3.283*** 3.680*** 
 (0.159) (0.108) (0.107) (0.070) 
Cut 4 4.928*** 5.233*** 5.246*** 5.482*** 
 (0.162) (0.110) (0.109) (0.075) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes No 
Log-likelihood -32117.430 -63431.947 -63797.939 -50204.806 
Between-class variance  0.313  0.519  0.261 0.300 
 (0.054) (0.042) (0.024) (0.033) 
Observations 24,625 48,818 49,148 39,463 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The list of controls includes social trust base model’s 
variables. In column (1), we follow Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003) and restrict our analysis to male 
employees since the effects of learning for women require a different modelling approach. In column 
(2), we restrict the sample to employees with hours per week top coded at 60 since hours worked vary 
widely in our dataset. In column (3), the sample is restricted to people aged between 20-65 to avoid a 
bias caused by the fact that the majority of young people between the ages of 16 and 20 are still being 
educated and hence those in the labour market might not be representative of the young population 
(Hanushek, Woessmann & Zhang, 2011). In column (4), we restrict our sample to the respondents who 
are not employed or out of the labour market for any reason whereas limiting the trust regression to the 
four factors introduced by our model. This strategy is expected to offset the bias caused by the fact that 
trust base model includes many employment-related variables and hence our analysis is often 
performed on the sample of employed individuals.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
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Appendix 2. 
Robustness Check: Controlling for Endogeneity in Trust Regressions  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Knowledge  1.306*** 0.086*** 0.101*** 0.044*** 
 (0.059) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Others-regarding  -0.027*** -0.043*** -0.006*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Cognition  0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Context  0.178*** 0.247*** 0.256*** 0.758*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019) 
Constant 0.324*** -0.047 0.937*** 0.418*** 
 (0.057) (0.124) (0.083) (0.043) 
Observations 55,323 40,173 63,919 55,537 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) contains the results of an instrumental 
variable (IV) regression, in which knowledge to trust is instrumented with an individual’s working 
hours per week and countries’ mean values for respondents’ altruism levels. The altruism variable is 
considered to be the foundation of trust and is operationalized through the question asking the extent to 
which respondents agree that is important to help other people and care about others‘ wellbeing. The 
European Social Survey (ESS) data from the year 2012 are used as a source for the altruism variable. 
Column (2) reports the results of an IV regression, in which we instrument the others-regarding 
component with the following set of PIAAC variables: the respondent’s work experience length in 
years, the type of the respondent’s employment contract, the intensity of computer use at work, the 
need for further training, company size, number of people living in the respondent’s household, and the 
respondent’s job industry code. Column (3) reports the results for the IV regression, in which the 
cognition component is instrumented with the mother’s immigration background and the number of 
people living in the respondent’s household. In addition, we employ a conventional psychological 
approach to instrument the respondent's genetics through the mother's level of education (Cunha & 
Heckman, 2008). Column (4) presents the results of an IV regression in which we instrument the 
contextual component with the Freedom House civil liberties index (as in Fidrmuc, 2003) and 
countries’ morale culture calculated as the average of responses to two ESS questions asking whether 
respondents consider it wrong to (1) make an exaggerated or false insurance claim and (2) buy 
something that they think might be stolen. 
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
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Figure 1. Model of Trust Level Choice 
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Figure 2. Grouping of Countries Based on the Four Trust Factors  
 
Notes: Dendrogram using Complete Linkage. Cluster method: furthest neighbour. Interval measure: squared Euclidean distance. Austria is included in the cluster 
analysis despite the fact that this country has been omitted from the majority of calculations due to the lack of many work-related or education-related variables. 
Excluding Austria from the cluster analysis did not alter the above country grouping. 
 
                                  
 
        C A S E          0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label                  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  Germany                 ─┐ 
  Czech Rep.              ─┤ 
  Austria                 ─┤ 
  Russian Fed.            ─┤ 
  Denmark                 ─┤ 
  Estonia                 ─┼─────────┐ 
  Belgium                 ─┤         │ 
  Slovak Rep.             ─┘         ├─────────────────────────────────────┐ 
  Norway                  ─┐         │                                     │ 
  Sweden                  ─┤         │                                     │ 
  Netherlands             ─┼─────────┘                                     │ 
  Finland                 ─┤                                               │ 
  Japan                   ─┘                                               │ 
  Italy                   ─┬─────┐                                         │ 
  Spain                   ─┘     │                                         │ 
  Ireland                 ─┐     ├─────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
  Poland                  ─┤     │ 
  USA                     ─┤     │ 
  UK                      ─┼─────┘ 
  France                  ─┤ 
  Korea                   ─┘ 
 
  
 
Figure 3. A Four-Dimensional Visualisation of Country Groupings According to the Four Trust Factors’ Level of Development 
 
Notes: Austria is included in the calculation of group averages.  
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